Compatibility of Quantitative and Qualitative Representations of Belief by Wong, Michael S. K. M. et al.
418 
Compatibility of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Representations of Belief 
S.K.M. Wong, Y.Y. Yao, and P. Lingras 
Department of Computer Science, University of Regina 
Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada S4S OA2 
Abstract 
The compatibility of quantitative and quali­
tative representations of beliefs was studied 
extensively in probability theory. It is only 
recently that this important topic is consiJ­
ered in the context of belief functions. In 
this paper, the compatibility of various quan­
titative belief measures and qualitative belief 
structures is investigated. Four classes of be­
lief measures considered are: the probabil­
ity function, the monotonic belief function, 
Shafer's belief function, and Smets' general­
ized belief function. The analysis of their 
individual compatibility with Jiffercut belief 
structures not only provides a sound basis for 
these quantitative measures, but also allevi­
ates some of the difficulties in the acquisition 
and interpretation of numeric belief numbers. 
It is shown that the structure of qualilati·ve 
probability is compatible with monotonic be­
lief functions. Moreover, a belief structure 
slightly weaker than that of q1lalitative belief 
is compatible with Smets' generalized belief 
functions. 
1 INT RODUCTION 
Uncertainty is always present in modeling realistic sit­
uations. It may stem from a lack of knowledge, the in­
completeness or the unreliability of the information at 
our disposal. In orJer to draw a meaningful conclusion 
under uncertain situations, we may have to express our 
beliefs in a number of propositions. Many approaches 
have been proposed for representing, measuring, and 
reasoning with uncertain information. Despite the di­
versities of these methods, one can divide them into 
two classes: the quantitative (numeric) and the quali­
tative (non-numeric) approaches (Bhatnagar and and 
Kana!, 1986; Spiegelhalter, 198G; Satoh, 1989). In the 
quantitative approach, a number is associated with 
each proposition to indicate the degree to which one 
believes in that proposition. That is, we express our 
belief in a proposition by a numeric value. To make the 
quantitative representation of beliefs consistent and 
meaningful, certain axioms or rules should be observed 
in expressing one's beliefs. For example, if beliefs are 
measured by a probability function, the Kolmogorm 
axioms for probability should be satisfied in order to 
maiutain consistency. In the qualitative approach, be­
liefs are expressed by a preference relation on a set of 
propositions. As in quantitative measures of beliefs, 
such a relation must be consistently defined. For ex­
ample, if a person believes more in proposition A than 
in proposition B, and also believes more in B than 
in C, then it is reasonable to assume that he would 
believe more in A than in C. In this paper, we are 
interested in those belief structures which are compat­
ible with some well known belief measures. 
Both the quantitative and qualitative approaches arc 
very useful for the management of uncertainty. In fact, 
probability theory has been extensively studied within 
the quantitative as well as the qualitative frameworks 
(Fishburn, 1970; Savage, 1972; Fine, 1973). Given 
a belief measure and a preference relation, an impor­
tant question one inevitably would ask is whether they 
are compatible with each other. This is indeed one of 
the fundamental issues in measurement theory, which 
is concemed to a large extent with the mathemati­
cal modeling of preferences and beliefs (French, 1986). 
Depending on the context, a preference relation is also 
referred to as a comparative probability, possibility, 
or belief relation. The compatibility of a comparative 
probability relation and a probability function was in­
vestigated by many authors (Fishburn, 1970; Savage, 
1972; Fine, 1973). Dubois (1986) studied the com­
patibility of a comparative possibility relation and a 
possibility function. Possibility functions were origi­
nally proposed by Zadeh (1978) within the framework 
of fuzzy sets, and they were later shown to be closely 
related to consonant belief functions introduced in the 
theory of evidence (Shafer, 1976). Wong et a!. (1990) 
studied the compatibility of a comparative belief re­
lation and a belief function. There is an important. 
class of preference relations referred to as qualitative 
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probability (Savage, 1972). However, until now it is 
not known which class of belief functions is compat­
ible with qualitative probability relations. Recently, 
Smets (1988) proposed a generalized version of belief 
functions. It is interesting to investigate what kind of 
preference relation is compatible with Smets' general­
ized belief functions. 
In this paper, our discussion will focus on the compat­
ibility of quantitative and qualitative representations 
of beliefs. In particular, we analyze four cla%es of 
quantitative belief measures, namely, the probability 
function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's belief 
function, and Smets' generalized belief function, and 
their compatibility with different kinds of preference 
relations. We will show that qualitative probability 
relations are compatible with monotonic belief func­
tions, and that a preference stmctme slightly weaker 
than that of qualitative belief is compatible with gen­
eralized belief functions. 1\'lore importantly, we believe 
that the study of the compatibility of these qualitative 
and quantitative representations of belief.� may provide 
a foundation for developing a generalized utility theory 
(Jaffray, 1989). 
2 QUANTITATIVE BELIEF 
MEASURES 
Based on the notion of belief functions (Shafer, 1976), 
we will identify four different classes of quantitative 
measures of belief. 
Let e = { 01, . . •  , IJ,} denote a finite set of possible an­
swers to a question, which is referred to as the frame of 
discernment or simply the frame defined by the ques­
tion. Following the convention of representing a propo­
sition by a subset of e, the power set 2° denotes the 
set of all propositions discerned by frame e. A quanti­
tative belief measure can be viewed as a mapping from 
2° to the real numbers. 
Definition 1: A probability function Pis a mapping 
from 2° to the interval [0, 1), P : 2° - [0, 1), which 
satisfies the following axioms: 
(B1) 
(B2) 
(B3) 
?(0) = 0, 
P(e) = 1, 
For A, BE 2° with An B = 0, 
P(A U B)= P(A) + P(B). 
Axiom (B3) is usually referred to as the additit,ity ax­
iom. By replacing this axiom with the sup-additive 
axiom, another cla�s of quantitative belief measures 
called belief functions (Shafer, 1976) can be defined as 
follows. 
Definition 2: A belief function Bel IS a mapping 
from 2° to the interval [0, 1), Bel : 2° - [0, 1), which 
satisfies (Bl), (B2), and the sup-additive axiom: 
(B3') For every integer n > 0 and 
every collection .41, A2, ... , An E 2°, 
Bei(A1 U A2 ... U An) 2: 
L Bei(Ai)- L Bei(A; n A1) ± ... + 
i<j 
( -1t+1 Bei(A1 n A2 ... nAn). 
A belief function can be equivalently defined by a map­
ping from 2° to the interval [0, 1), m : 2° __, [0, 1]. 
which is called a basic probability assignment satisfy­
ing the axioms: 
(M1) m(0) = 0 ,  
(M2) L m(A) = 1 .  
AE29 
In terms of the basic probability assignment, the belief 
in a proposition A E 2° can be expressed as: 
(M3) Bel(A) = L m(B), 
B�A 
where the summation is restricted to the elements /l 
in 2°, which are subsets of A. Conversely, given a be­
lief function one can construct the corresponding ba­
sic probability assignment. Therefore, belief function" 
can be defined either by axioms (B1),(B2), and (B:3') 
or by axioms (M1)-(M3). 
Axioms (B1) and (B2) state that the proposition 0 
is believed to be false (impossibility) and the proposi­
tion e is believed to be true (certainty). These two ax­
ioms indicate that the closed world assumption (Smets, 
1988) is in fact used to define the frame of discernment 
e. That is, one has implicitly assumed that the frame 
e consists of all possible answers to a given question 
and only one of these answers is correct. On the other 
hand, axiom (B3') indicates that belief functions are 
sup-additive, and become additive in the degenerated 
case. Thus, additive probability functions belong to 
the class of degenerated belief functions. 
Note that the additivity axiom implies the monotonic­
ity axiom, namely: 
(B4) For A, B, C E 2° with (AU B) n C = 0, 
P(A) > P(B) <===> P(A U C) > P(B U C). 
However, monotonicity does not imply additivity, and 
axioms (B1), (B2), and (B3') do not imply monotonic­
ity. This means that belief functions do not necessarily 
satisfy axiom (B4). In some applications, it is desirable 
that the monotonicity axiom (B4) is satisfied (Savage, 
1972). In that case, we can define another class of be­
lief measures, which falls between the belief functions 
and the probability functions. 
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Figure 1: Relationships Between Quantitative Measures of Belief 
Definition 3: A belief function Bel is called a mono­
tonic belief function if it satisfies the monotonicity ax­
iom (B4). 
We will show that monotonic belief functions are com­
patible with the qualitative probability t·elations. 
Smets ( 1988) pointed out that the condition ( 1\11), 
m(0) = 0, reflects the closed world assumption im­
plicitly used in Shafer's definition of belief function; 
m.(0) > 0 reflects the open world assumption. With 
the open world assumption, the probability mass m(0) 
can be interpreted as the belief commit ted exactly to 
the proposition that the true answer is not in the frame 
e. Smets' belief functions, written bel, satisfy the fol­
lowing axioms: 
(M2) L m(A) = 1, 
.. 4E2e 
(M3') bel(A) = L.:: m(B). 
BCA 
8�0 
The condition m(0) > 0 has also been considered by 
Dubois and Prade (1986) under a set-theoretic view of 
belief functions. The generalized belief functions can 
be equivalently defined as follows. 
Definition 4: A generalized belief function bel is a 
mapping from 2° to the interval [0, 1], bel: 2° � [0, 1], 
which satisfies axioms (131), (133'), and 
(B2') be/(0) = 1- m(0), 
where 0 :::; m(0) :::; 1. 
In the above discussion, we have considered four 
classes of quantitative belief measures: the probability 
function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's be­
lief function, and Smets' generalized belief function. 
The relationships between these measures are shown 
in Figure 1. The set of probability functions is a sub­
set of the set of monotonic belief functions, and so on. 
In the following section, we will study the preference 
structures that are compatible with these quantitative 
belief measures. 
3 PREFERENCE REL ATIONS 
VERSUS QUANTITATIVE 
BELIEF MEASURES 
In the qualitative representation of beliefs, it is as­
sumed that one is able to express one's preference 
on any two propositions A, B E 2°, without stat­
ing numerically how much one prefers proposition A 
to proposition B. Qualitative judgments can be de­
scribed in terms of a preference relation>--. By A>-- B. 
we mean that A is preferred to B. In the absence of 
strict preference, i.e., �(A >-- B) and �(B >-- A), we say 
that A and B are indifferent, written A � B. We also 
write A� B if A>-- B or A� B. The relationship be­
tween the quantitative and qualitative representations 
of beliefs can be formally stated as follows. 
Definition 5: Suppose 0 is a frame, J is a function 
mapping the elements of 2° onto the set of real num­
bers, and >-- is a preference relation on 2°. vVe say 
that f and >-- are compatible with each other if for 
A, BE 2°, 
A>-- B <==::> f(A) > f(B). 
A function f is said to represent >-- if it is compatible 
with )--. 
Clearly, whether a preference relation is compatible 
with a particular quantitative belief measure depends 
very much on the preference structure representing the 
qualitative judgments. 
Now consider a special class of preference relations 
characterized by the following two axioms: 
(Q1) asymmetric : 
A>-- B => �(B >-- A) , 
(Q2) negatively transitive : 
HA >-- B) , �(B >-- C)) =>�(A>-- C) 
Axiom (Q1) suggests that if one commits more belief 
in A than in B, one should not at the same time com­
mit more belief in B than in A. If this axiom holcb 
for a preference relation >--, then for every A, B E 2°. 
A � B <==::> �(B >-- A). Axiom (Q2) demands that 
if one does not commit more belief in A than in B, 
nor commits more belief in B than in C, one should 
not commit more belief in A than in C. A preference 
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relation >- satisfying these two axioms is called a weak 
order which can be represented by a real-valued func­
tion (Fishburn, 1970; Roberts, 1976 ) . 
Theorem 1. Suppose 8 is a finite set and >- a pref­
erence relation on 2e. There exists a real-valued func­
tion f on 2° such that for every A, 13 E 2°, 
A>- B <:=:? f(A) > f(B) 
if and only if the relation>- satisfies nxioms (Q1) ami 
(Q2). Moreover, f is uniquely defined up to a strictly 
monotonic transformation. 
This theorem is important because it suggests that 
any belief characterized by a weak order can be mea­
sured in terms of an ordinal scale. Theorem 1 there­
fore provides a basis for representing various types of 
preference relations. However, axioms (Q1) and (Q2) 
alone are not sufficient to guarantee that the prefer­
ence structure is compatible with any of the belief mea­
sures introduced in the last section. Additional condi­
tions are required to differentiate different preference 
structures. 
A special type of preference relation known a$ qualita­
tive probability was studied extensively in probability 
theory (de Finetti, 1937; Fishburn, 1970; Savage, UJ72; 
Dubois, 1986). 
Definition G: Let 8 be a frame. A preference rela­
tion>- defined on 2° is called a qualitative probability 
relation if it satisfies (QI), (Q2) and the following ad­
ditional axioms: for A, B, C E 2°, 
(Q3) nontriviality : 8 >- 0, 
(Q4) improbability of impossibilit.y : -.(0 >- A), 
(Q5) monotonicity : 
(Au IJ) n c"' 0 = 
(A>- B <:=:?Au C >- 13 u C). 
Axioms (Q1)-(Q5) are necessary but not sufficient 
to guarantee the existence of a probability function 
(Kraft, Pratt., and Seidenberg, 1959). Scott (196·1) 
gave the necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex­
istence of a probability function for a finite set. Let 
ItA denote the characteristic function of a subset A 
of 8 such that JlA(O) = 1 if 0 E A, and p,1(0) = 0 
otherwise. Scott's theorem can be stated as follows. 
Theore1n 2. Let 8 be a frame and >- a preference 
relation on 2°. There exists a probability function, 
P : 2° � [0, 1], satisfying: for A, B E 2°, 
A>- B <:=:? P(A) > P(13), 
if and only if >- satisfies (QI), (Q3), (Q1) and the 
following axiom: 
(S) For all subsets A0, ... , A,, 130, ... , 13, of 8, 
if A; � B; for 0 ::; i < n, and 
JlAo(O) + ... + J1A.(0) = J1B0(0) + ... + f.lBn(O), 
for all 0 E 8, then Bn � An. 
Axiom (S) requires that any element () of 8 is in ex­
actly a$ many A; a$ B;. In fact, axiom (S) implies 
both axioms (Q2) and (Q5) provided that axiom (Ql) 
holds. For example, let (A U B) n C = 0. Suppose 
B � A. We have: for all() E 8, 
Jts(O) + JIAuc(O) = JIA(()) + JlBuc(O). 
According to axiom (S), B U C � AU C. Similarly, if 
B U C � AU C, axiom (S) implies B � A. Therefore, 
(AU B) n C = 0 = ( B � A <:=:? B U C � AU C). 
Recall that axiom ( Q 1) implies B � A <:=:? -.(A >- B). 
Thus, 
(AU B)nC = 0 = (A>- B <:=:? AU C >- BU G). 
This means that axiom (S) implies axiom (Q5) if axioJJI 
(Q1) holds. 
Theorem 2 only suggests the existence of a probabil­
ity function; there may exist functions other than the 
probability functions, which are also compatible with 
a preference relation satisfying (Ql), (Q3), (Q4), and 
(S). 
Since probability functions are a special type of be­
lief functions, it is expected that there exists a weaker 
preference structure for belief functions. 
Definition 7: Let 8 be a frame. A preference rela­
tion >- defined on 2° is called a qualitative belief re­
lation if it satisfies (Q1)-(Q3), and the axioms: for 
A, B, CE2°, 
(Q4') 
(Q5') 
dominance: A 2 B = -.(B >- A) , 
partial monotonicity : 
(A :::J B, An C= 0) = 
(A >- B = AU C >- B U C). 
Axiom (Q3) eliminates the trivial preference relation, 
i.e., A� B for all A, BE 2°. The dominance axiom 
(Q1') says that one should not commit more belief in 
a subset than in the set itself. This axiom is stronger 
than (Q4). Given the axioms (Q1) and (Q2) of a. weak 
order, the dominance axiom can be expressed equiv­
alently M A 2 B = A � B. Obviously, axiom 
(Q5') is a weaker form of the monotonicity axiom (Q5 ). 
It is important to note that (Q1)-(Q3) together with 
(Q4')-(Q5') form a set of independent axioms which 
completely characterize the qualitative belief relations. 
The following theorem (Wong et a!., 1990) shows that 
qualitative belief relations are indeed compatible with 
belief functions. 
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Thcormn 3. Let 8 be a frame and � a preference 
relation on 2°. There exists a belief function, Bel : 
2°--> [0, 1], satisfying: for A, BE 2°, 
A� B <=:} Bel(A) > Bel(B) 
if and only if the preference relation � is a qualitative 
belief relation. 
We can prove the only if part of the theorem trivially 
from the properties of belief functions. The if part 
of the theorem can be proved by constructing a belief 
function compatible with a qualitative belief relation. 
Axioms (Q1) and (Q2) imply that the induced indif­
ference relation� is an equivalence relation ( Fishbum, 
1970). Since axiom (Q5) holds, based on the relation 
�
, we can partition 2° into at least two equivalence 
classes Eo, ... , Ek (k 2': 1 ). Au equivaleuce E, is also 
denoted as [A] if A E E,. For example, Eo may be writ­
ten as [0] and Ek as [8]. First we rccmsi,·cly construct. 
a function f on the equivalence elasses as follows: 
where 
(i) !(Eo)= 0, 
(ii) f(En+!) = nmx{f'(E,+J),f(E,) + 1} 
if for every A E En+I, A :::J B ===> B ¢ En+I; oth­
erwise f'(En+I) = f(En) + l. The symbol I ·I de­
notes the cardinality of a set. The function thus con­
structed may be considered as an unnormali:ed belief 
function which satisfies A � B <=:} f([A]) > f([B]) 
for A, B E 2°. Based on the function }', we can then 
construct a normalized belief function: 
Bel(A) = f
([A]) 
/([8]). 
Theorem 3 shows that if a preference relation is a 
qualitative belief, i.e., it satisfies axioms ( Q I)-( Q:3), 
(Q4'), and (Q5'), then there exists a belief function 
compatible with the relation. However, these axioms 
do not guarantee that the class of belief functions is 
the only kind of functions representing qualitative be­
lief (Smets, 1990). As we mentioned earlier, the same 
can be said about Scott's theorem. For example, con­
sider a preference relation defined by {01, 112} � {02} � 
{ OI} >- 0. Obviously, this relation satisfies the ax­
ioms for qualitative belief as well as those required by 
Scott's theorem. It can be represented either by a 
probability function: 
P(0) 0.0, 
P( {OJ}) 0.4, 
P( {OJ) 0.6, 
P( { 01, O:J) 1.0, 
or by a belief function: 
Be1(0) 0.0, 
Bel({OI}) 0.2, 
Bel({02}) 0.5, 
Be/({01,02}) 1.0. 
This relation can also be represented by another func­
tion f which is neither a probability function nor a 
belief function: 
!(0) 0.0, 
f({OI}) 0.6, 
!({02}) 0.7, 
J({OI,02}) 1 .0. 
Certaintly, it will be useful if one can define a set of 
axioms to characterize a class of preference relations 
that can be represented only by belief functions. This 
may, however, be a difficult task in general. For a spe­
cial type of belief functions known as consonant belief 
functions, Dubois ( 1 986) gave such a set of axioms. 
Based on Definition 7 and Theorem 3, we can now 
show that the qualitative probability relations are in 
fact compatible with the monotonic belief functions as 
defined by Definition 3. 
Lemma 1. Suppose 8 is a finite set and >- a prefer­
ence relation on 28. If� is a qualitative probability 
relation, it is also a qualitative belief relation. 
Proof: Axioms (Ql), (Q2), and (Q3) are satisfied by 
both qualitative probability and belief relations. Also. 
(Q5') is a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom 
(Q.5). Thus, it will suffice to prove that the dom­
inance axiom (Q4') follows from those axioms that 
define qualitative probability. Suppose A 2 B. Let 
A = B U C and B n C = 0. From •(0 � C) 
and axiom (Q5), it follows that the dominance axionr 
holds. Therefore, if a preference relation is a qualita­
tive probability relation, it is also a qualitative belief 
relation. 0 
Theorem 4. Let 8 be a frame and � a preference re­
lation on 2°. There exists a monotonic belief function, 
Bel : 2° � [0, 1], satisfying: for A, B E 2°, 
A >- B <=:} Bel(A) > Bel(B), 
if and only if the preference relation � is a qualitative 
probability relation. 
Proof: 
(only if) Suppose there exists a monotonic belief func­
tion Bel: 2° __, [0, 1] such that A� B <=:} Bel(A) > 
Bel(B). Then, the asymmetric and negatively transi­
tive properties of� immediately follow from the prop­
erties of the relation > on real numbers. In other 
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Figure 2: Relationships between Quantitative and Qualitative Representations of Belief 
words, axioms (Ql) and (Q2) hold. The axiom (Q:3) 
of non triviality, 8 >- 0, is implied by axioms (131) 
and (B2), because Be1(8) = 1 > 0 = Be./(0). Ax­
iom (Q4) can be trivially proved from the fact that 
Be/(0) = 0 and Bel(A) 2: 0 for all A E 2°. Now sup­
pose An C = B n C = 0. From t.he assumption that 
A >- B {=} Bel( A) > Bel( B) and axiom ( !31), we 
obtain: 
A>- B {=} Bel(A) > Bel(B) 
{=} Bel(A U C) > Bel( B U C) 
{=} AU C >-B U C. 
That is, the monotonicity axiom (Q5) holds. 
(if) From Lemma 1, we know that a qualitative prob­
ability relation is also a qualitative belief relation. By 
Theorem 3, there exists a belief function Bel satisfy­
ing the condition: A >- B {=} IJel(A) > Bcl(IJ) for 
A, B E 2°. From the monot.onicity axio111 (Q5), we 
have: for An C = I3 n C = 0, 
Bel(A) > Bel(B) {=} A>-13 
{=} AUC>-BUC 
{=} Bcl(A u C) > Bel( B u C). 
This means that Bel satisfies axiom (B•l). 0 
Note that axioms (B1) and (B2) imply axiom (Q:3), 
i.e., 8 >- 0. Thus, (Q3) may be weakened or elimi­
nated under the open world assumption. In fact, the 
following theorem shows that the preference structure 
compatible with the generalized belief functions ca11 
be defined by a set of axioms without (Q:)). 
Theorem 5. Let 8 be a frame and >- a pn;ference 
relation on 2°. There exists a generalized belief func­
tion, bel : 2° __, [0, 1], satisfying: for A, B E 2°, 
A>-B {=} bel(A) > bel( B), 
if and only if the preference relation >- satisfies axioms 
(Q1)-(Q2) and (Q4')-(Q5'). 
proof: 
(only if) The proof is similar to that of the only if 
part in Theorem 4. 
(if) Since the dominance axiom implies �(0 >- 8), we 
only have to consider two separate cases: (i) 8 � 0 
and (ii) 8 >- 0. Obviously, the second case with 
8 >- 0 is equivalent to Theorem 3. If 8 � 0, from 
axioms (Ql), (Q2), and (Q4'), one can immediately 
conclude that for any A, B E 2°, the relationship 
A >-B is always false, namely, A � B is always true 
(Wong, Bollmann, and Yao, 1990). In this case, we 
can construct a generalized belief function by letting 
m(0) = 1. That is, according to (M3'), bel(A) = 0 
for all A. E 2°. For this belief function bel, the con­
clition A >- B {=} bel(A) > bel(B) holds for any 
A, BE2°. 0 
The results of the compatibility of preference relations 
and belief measures are summarized in Figure 2. It ca11 
be seen that the inclusion relation C between differclll 
classes of quantitative belief measures corresponds to 
the implication relation = between different sets or 
axioms defining the various preference relations. The 
links established here between these belief measures 
and preference relations provide a better understand­
ing of modeling uncertainty with beliefs. 
In this preliminary investigation, we have not consiu­
ered all the important classes of belief functions. It is 
worth mentioning here that Dubois (1986) proposed 
a set of axioms to characterize consonant belief func­
tions. A more detailed analysis of various types of 
preference relations will be reported in a subsequctlt. 
paper. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we studied the compatibility of quan­
titative and qualitative representations of beliefs. In 
particular, four classes of quantitative belief measures 
were analyzed, namely, the probability function, the 
monotonic belief function, Shafer's belief funct.ion, 
and Smets' generalized belief function. \Ve estab­
lished their individual compatibility with different be­
lief structures. These compatibility relationships not 
only provide a justification for the use of these quan­
titative measures, but also alleviate some of the diffi­
culties in the acquisition and interpretation of numeric 
424 Wong, Yao, and Lingras 
belief numbers. 
We have shown that the qualitative probability struc­
ture is compatible with monotonic belief functions, 
and a belief structure slight.ly weaker than that of qual­
itative belief is compatible with Srnet.s' generalized be­
lief functions. More importantly, the qualitative and 
quantitative representations of beliefs rnay lead to the 
development of a generalized utility theory for decision 
making with belief functions. 
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